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MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife; 
and EDWIN CARMAN, 
Plaintiffs and AppE~"ji_";(ii•:~ ~~~;;~-C~~t~ u~-;;·--·· 
vs. 
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Es-
tate of HANNAH J. BRAFFET, Deceased; 
· DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR., as Administrator 
with the will annexed of the Estate of JOHN 
MAXCY ZANE, Deceased; THE CO'NTI-
NENTAL BANK & TRUST CO·MPANY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, as Administrator of the 
Estate of DAVID G. SMITH, Deceased; 
JUANITA G. SMITH, surviving wife of DA-
VID G. SMITH, Deceased; HELEN B. 
MOTT; L. L. PACK and NO·RA E. PACK, 
his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
' 
JESSUP THOMAS and IRENE THOMAS, 
his wife; WILLIAM H. VAN TASSELL and 
APHNE VAN TASELL, his wife; ORVEN J. 
MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife; 
and EDWIN CARMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Es-
tate of HANNAH J. BRAFFET, Deceased; 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR., as Administrator 
with the will annexed of the Estate of JOHN 
MAXCY ZANE, Deceased; THE C01NTI-
NENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, as Administrator of the 
Estate of DAVID G. SMITH, Deceased; 
JUANITA G. SMITH, surviving wife of DA-
VID G. SMITH, Deceased; HELEN B. 
MOTT; L. L. PACK and NO,RA E. PACK, 
his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
~NO. 8519 
We agree generally with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in appellants' brief, but we think it might be helpful 
to further delineate them. 
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In this · action, as well as in the previous actions filed 
by appellants against respondents, to which reference will 
hereafter be made, appellants seek to quiet title to 600 acres 
of desert land in Duchesne County, Utah. Mark P. Braffet 
formerly owned this land, he being the grantee of the paten-
tee. During his lifetime he conveyed to different parties 
undivided interests in the land, the total of these grants 
amounting to an undivided two-thirds interest. Among the 
grantees was John M. Zane, to whom he conveyed an un-
divided one-sixth interest. Mark P. Braffet's wife, who 
was then living, did not join in any of these conveyances. 
The taxes were not paid by anyone, and in 1929 all the land 
was sold for delinquent taxes. In 1945, Duchesne County 
conveyed its interest to appellant Jessup Thomas, and in 
the same year Maude Braffet White Waring, a daughter 
of Mark P. Braffet, who had received a conveyance to said 
property by a decree of distribution in the estate of Mark 
P. Braffet, conveyed her interest to David G. Smith. Since 
that time, Thomas and Smith have each conveyed part of 
their interests, Thomas to the other named appellants and 
Smith to Helen B. Mott, L. L. Pack and Horace Coltharp. 
Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, when reference is made 
to Smith and his three grantees, they will referred to as 
the Smiths. 
PLEADINGS 
The complaint in this case is a short form seeking 
merely to quiet title to 600 acres of land. There were a 
number of defendants named in the complaint and sum-
mons, but service of summons was made only on the re-
spondents David G. Smith, L. L. Pack, W. H. Coltharp and 
their wives, and on Helen B. Mott. 
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The complaint alleges that the respondents claim some 
right, title and interest in the land described in the com-
plaint, and the Smiths filed their answers, in which they 
admitted the same, and in their prayer asked to have an 
undivided one-third interest in the land quieted in them 
subject to any right that Maude Braffet vVhite Waring 
might have in the oil, gas and mineral rights. Karl V. King, 
as administrator of the estate of Hannah J. Braffet, de-
ceased, and Dallas H·. Young, Jr., as administrator with the 
will ~nexed of the estate of John Maxcy Zane, deceased, 
intervened in the case without objection on the part of the 
appellants. We will make no further reference to the claim 
made by Karl V. King as administrator of the estate of 
Hannah J. Braffet, because the administrator has conceded 
and the court has found that there \vas no basis for such 
claim, and this issue is not before the Court. 
In the motion of intervention filed by the administra-
tor of the John Maxcy Zane estate, the issue was raised as 
to whether the dismissal of the actions against the Zane 
estate operated as an adjudication upon the merits. 
The defenses interposed by the s.miths and the motion 
filed by intervenor Zane are different, but for sake of con-
venience the cases were consolidated for trial. The case 
was tried on the complaint of the appellants, the answer of 
the Smiths, and the motion of the intervenors. Appellants 
did not plead the statute of limitations. Counsel for appel-
lants and respondents and the court, on the trial of the case 
and in all briefs which were submitted by counsel for each 
of the parties, proceeded as though the statute had been 
pleaded and as though a plea in avoidan~ce had been inter-
posed by the respondents Smiths. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The case was first heard on the 26th day of April, 1954, 
and the court found the issues in favor of the Smiths and 
the two intervenors. Later -counsel for respondents in-
formed the court that they were of the opinion that the 
judgment in favor of the administrator of the Hannah J. 
Braffet estate could not be sustained, and the court gran-
ted a new trial as to all parties. The trial from which this 
appeal is taken was heard on the 25th day of April, 1955, 
and at the commencement of the trial, appellants filed what 
they denominated a reply to respondents' answers. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE F AlLURE OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY AU-
DITO'R TO ATTACH HIS AFFIDAVIT TO THE ASSESS-
MENT ROLL IN THE YEAR 1929 VOIDED THE TAX 
SALE MADE BY DUCHESNE COUNTY. 
POINT II 
THE EVEDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF 
THE COURT THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
UPON WHICH APPELLANTS RELIEID, WAS TOLLED 
BY THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 2693 AND THE 
ANSWER AND APPEARANCE OF THE RESPOND-
E'NT SMITHS IN SAID ACTION FROM JULY 27, 1951 
TO JUNE 23, 1952 AND BY THE FILING O~F CIVIL AC-
TION NO. 2764 AND THE ANSWER AND APPEAR-
ANCE O·F THE RESPONDENTS SMITH IN SAID AC-
Tl!ON FROM JUNE 25, 1952 UNTIL THE PRESENT 
TIME. 
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POINT ill 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW SUPPORT THE 
FINDING O·F THE COURT THAT THE DISMISSAL O~F 
CIVIL ACTIONS NOS. 2663, 269·3 AND 2674 WAS AN 
ADJUDICATION UPO·N THE MERITS AS FAR AS THE 
ESTATE ·O'F JOHN MAXCY ZANE, DE·CEASED, IS 
CONCERNED. 
POINT IV 
THE ESTATE O·F HANNAH J. BRAFFET, iDE-
CEASED, HAS NO RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN 
THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT AND 
IN THE FINDiNGS O·F FACT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAILURE O~F THE DUCHESNE COUNTY AU-
DIT01R TO ATT.A:CH HIS AFFID·AVIT TO THE ASSESS-
MENT ROLL IN THE YEAR 1929 V:OIDED THE TAX 
SALE MADE BY DUCHESNE CO,UNTY. 
The stipulation entered into between appellants and 
respondents in open court shows that the auditor's affi-
davit was not attached to the assessment roll for the year 
1929. Under the rule laid down in the case of Telonis. v. 
Staley, 114 .Utah 537, 144 Pac. 2d 513, the tax title received 
by appellants is void. 
Our Supreme Court has stated that in an action to 
quiet title, plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the strength 
of his own title and not by the weakness of the defendants' 
title. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 Pac. 2d 862. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF 
TH'E C10URT THAT THE STATl.ITE OF LIMITATIONS, 
UPO,N WHICH APPELLANTS RELIED, WAS TOLLED 
BY THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 2693 AND THE 
ANSWE.R AND APPEARANCE OF THE RESPOND-
ENT SMITHS IN SAID ACTIO·N FROM JULY 27, 1951 
TO JUNE 23, 1952 AND BY THE FILING OF CIVIL AC-
TION NO. 2764 AND THE ANSWER AND APPEAR-
AN~CE OIF THE RESPONDENTS SMITH IN S.AliD AC-
TION FROM JUNE 25, 1952 UNTIL THE PRESENT 
TIME. 
We now direct our remarks to the question as to 
vvhether the statute of limitations has been tolled, but in 
reciting the evidence relating to this question, reference 
of necessity will . have to be made to evidence which also 
applies to the Zane estate. 
The record shows that the appellants filed their first 
action against the Smiths and the other respondent in the 
District c·ourt of the Fourth Judicial District in Duchesne 
County on May 22, 1946, Civil No. 2263. The S~th inter-
ests appeared in said action through Mr. Henry Ruggeri 
of Pri~ce, Utah. On the lOth day of October, 1949, the at-
torney for the appellants moved that the action be dis-
missed. Upon said motion the action was dismissed. Again 
on June 23, 1952, the firm of Stanley and- Lewis moved the 
court for dismissal of the same case, and order for dismis-
sal was signed by the court. 
On July 27, 1951, Civil Action No. 2693 was filed by 
the appellants against all the respondents named in the 
present action. To this complaint the Smith interests filed 
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an answer on August 20, 1951. On May 3, 1952, appellants 
filed what. they denominated a ·reply to this answer, and 
on June 23, 1952, the attorneys for appellants moved· the 
court for an order dismissing the action without prejudice, 
and on said day the action was dismissed. 
Two days thereafter, to-wit: June 25, 1952, the same 
appellants filed Civil Action No. 2764, the present action, 
against the respondents named in the actions theretofore 
dismissed. Pursuant to stipulation, attorneys for the Smith 
interests entered their appearance. On the 14th day of 
Septe1nber, 1953, attorneys for appellants and the Carter 
Oil Company moved to dismiss the action as to all respond-
ents, except the Smith interests. The motion to dismiss 
was granted. 
As to the Smiths, the trial court found that the com-
mencement of Civil Action No. 2693 by the appellants and 
the answer of the Smiths tolled the statute of limitations 
from July 27, 1951, until it ·was dimsissed on June 23, 1952, 
and that the filing of Civil Action No. 2764 on June 25, 1952 
and the filing of the answer by the Smith respondents has 
tolled the action since that time. 
The general principle of law is that the filing of a ·com-
plaint tolls the statute of limitations. In support of this 
proposition, we quote from Am. Juris., Vol. 34, Section 
247, page 202: 
"It is a firmly established rule that the commence-
ment of suit prior to the expiration of the applicable 
limitation period interrupts the running of the statute 
of li-mitations as to all parties to the action and their 
privies, not only as to causes of action set forth in the 
complaint or petition, but also as to all defenses which 
may :be interposed ·by the defendant. And by applic 
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cation of the principle, when, by amendment to the 
pleadings in a pending action, a person is brought into 
that action as· an additional party defendant, the stat-
ute of limitations ceases to run as to him from that 
time. Lapse of time cannot be relied upon to bar a 
suit in equity which is auxiliary to an action already 
commenced at law, if the latter was brought within 
the time limited. 
"The bringing ·by a claimant in adverse possession 
of land, of an action involving title thereto which is 
based on the existence of a right in another is such a 
recognition of that right as will arrest the running of 
the statute of limitaions in favor of the occupant and 
against such right. However, it is only as to the right 
claimed by the defendant in an action by the claimant 
in possession that the running of the statute is arres-
ted." 
As authority for the last sentence, the case of Weiner 
v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 Pac. 490, is cited. Counsel for 
appellants, in his brief, states that the Weiner v. Steams 
case, (supra) is directly in point on the question as to 
whether the statute was tolled by the filing of Civil Action 
No. 2693. Because the facts are different in the Weiner 
v. Stearns case (supra) , we do not think the case is square-
ly in point, but we do believe that the rationale contained 
therein sustains the position reached by the trial court in 
this case. We think a recital of the facts in the Weiner v. 
Stearns case (supra) may be of assistance to the Court. 
Weiner purchased certain lots in Salt Lake County in 
1898, the lots having been sold for taxes, and took posses-
sion thereof in 1899. He enclosed the lots within a fence 
and made other improvements thereon. In November, 1903, 
Weiner commenced an action against Amanda Stearns, she 
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being the owner of the lots at the time they were sold to 
Salt Lake County for delinquent taxes, to quiet title to the 
lots. The District C'ourt of Salt Lake ~county entered a de-
cree quieting title to the lots in Weiner. Subsequently,. Mrs. 
Stearns conveyed her interest to Addison Cain and Cain 
conveyed his interest to Peter Borg. Borg filed suit to set 
aside the decree obtained by Weiner, and in 1906 the de-
cree was set aside. In 1910, Weiner started an action to 
quiet title, alleging that he was the owner of the property 
by reason of adverse possession for more than seven years 
and the payment of taxes for that period. Borg's defense 
was that the seven year period had been interrupted by 
filing of the action by Weiner in 1903. The lower court 
held with Borg. The Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's decision, and in discussing the question as to whether 
the seven year period of limitation has been arrested, states 
as follows: 
"We confess our inability to understand how the 
bringing of an action by appellant, without any ap-
pearance by the defendant or any claim adverse to his 
rights, could have such effect. No doubt, if, afte~r in-
viting Almanda Stearns into court, she had appeared 
in the action, and had disputed appellant's title, the 
nmning of the statute, for the purpose of that action 
at least, would have been arrested. It is not true that 
the commencement of an action, under all circumstan-
ces, arrests the running of the statute of limitations. 
It is settled law that in case new parties are brought 
into a pending action as defendants, the statute of limi-
tations runs in their favor up to the time they are 
brought into the case." (Emphasis ours) 
In the Weiner v. Stearns case (supra), the purchaser 
at the tax sale filed his complaint naming the record owner 
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. as party defendant, but no proper service was ever made 
upon her. Weiner had been in possession of the property 
for a number of years. In this case the court found that 
appellants had not been in possession. In the Weiner case 
no appearance was made by the defendant. In the present 
case the Smiths appeared and filed their answer asking that 
title be quieted in them, so that the rationale as set forth 
in the Weiner v. Stearns case (supra) , clearly sustains the 
decision reached by the trial court. We submit that the 
position of the respondents is the same as though they had 
initiated the action and had joined the appellants as party 
defendants. Had this procedure been followed, could any-
one seriously contend that the statute was not tolled? 
Again adverting to appellants' contention that Civil 
Action No. 2693 was erroneously admitted ·because the re-
spondents Smiths had not made a plea in avoidance of the 
statute of limitations, ·we call attention to the fact that ap-
pellants never raised this question of limitations except by 
a pleading which they tenned as a reply filed at the com-
mencement of the last trial. We understand the purpose 
of reply is to deny new matters raised in the answers, and 
respondents raised no .matters in their answer which re-
quired a reply. 
Respondents do not seek to take advantage of the fact 
that appellants never properly pleaded the statute of limi-
tations, but we assert that appellants are in no position un-
der the record to raise the objection that respondents failed 
to make a plea of avoidance. In support of our position, 
respondents call attention to Rule 7 (a), U. R. C. P., which 
reads as follows: 
"Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim 
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denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the 
answer contains a cross-claim; a third party complaint, 
if leave is given under Rule 14 to summon a person 
who was not an original party; and there shall be a 
third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. 
No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third party an-
swer." 
We also invite the Court's attention to Rule 8, (d) and 
(f), U. R. C. P.: 
''(d) Effect of Failure to 1Deny. Averments in 
a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are ad-
mitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive plead-
ing is required or permitted shall be taken as denied 
or a voided.'' 
"(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings 
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
POINT ill 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE DISMISSAL O'F 
CIVIL ACTIONS NOS. 2663, 2693 AND 2674 WAS AN 
ADJUDICATION UPOIN THE MERITS AS FAR AS THE 
ESTATE OF JOHN MAXCY ZANE, DECEASED, IS 
CONCERNED~ 
The facts are not in dispute that in all actions filed ~by 
plaintifs in which they sought to quiet title to the land in 
question, the same land is described, and John M. Zane and 
his heirs were named as party defendants. The facts are 
also not in dispute that Civil Action No. 2263 was, by the 
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plaintiffs, dismissed either in 1949 or in 1952. There is no 
question that Civil Action No. 2692 was dismissed on June 
23, 1952, and that Civil Action No. 2764, as to Zanes, was 
dismissed on September 14, 1953. 
Counsel for appellants contends that these actions were 
dismised by the court and not by the appellants. For the 
Court's convenience we set forth Rule 41 (a) (1), U. R. 
C. P.: 
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 
66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court 
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a mo-
tion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipula-
tion of dismissal signed by all parties who have ap-
peared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the 
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal oper-
ates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by 
a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the 
United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim." 
This rule, which became effective January 1, 1950, has 
not been interpreted, so far as we know, by any of the 
western states. We believe the case of Robertshaw-Fulton 
Controls Company v. Noma Electric Corporation, reported 
in 10 F. R. D. 32, sets forth the law which applies in this 
case. This case was decided January 23, 1950, and the ac-
tion arose in the United Staes District Court, Department 
of Maryland. We quote the applicable portions of the 
court's opinion: 
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"The material facts are as follows: On November 
5, 1948, the plaintiff, a Delaware Corporation, filed suit 
in this court against the defendant, a Maryland cor-
poration, seeking a declaratory judgment . 
with respect to the rights of plaintiff and defendant in 
certain patents Previously, that is, on Sep-
tember 7, 1948, plaintiff had filed a similar suit in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
against another, the parent company, bearing the same 
name but incorporated under the laws of New York. 
This suit had been brought under the belief that the 
New York corporation and not the Maryland corpora-
tion owned the patents involved. However, upon being 
informed to the contrary, plaintiff brought suit in this 
court against the Maryland corporation and shortly 
thereafter, that is, on November 18, 1948, dismissed 
the New York action. 
" on July 22, plaintiff filed notice of dis-
missal of the present suit, this notice stating that 'pur-
suant to the provisions of Rule 41 (a); plaintiff hereby 
dismisses the above-entitled case without prejudice and 
without costs. Two days earlier, that is, on July 20, 
1949, plaintiff had instituted another suit against the 
New York Corporation in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York on the same claim. 
Thereupon, on August 3, defendant filed a motion in 
the proceeding in this Court to strike out plaintiff's 
notice of dismissal of July 22, or, in the alternative, for 
an order dismissing the action with prejudice pursu-
ant to Rule 41 (a). !Defendant has also filed a similar 
motion in the third suit in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York seeking dismissal of 
that suit on the ground that plaintiff having dismissed 
the first suit brought in that court, its filing of the no-
tice of dismissal in the suit in this, the Maryland Dis-
trict Court, amounts to an adjudication on the merits 
under Rule 41 (a). The motion in the District Court 
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in New York came on for hearing on October 25, 1949, 
but after arguments of counsel thereon, the Court de-
clined to dispose of the matter pending a decision on 
the similar motion filed in this Court. On December 
8, plaintiff filed in this Court notice of withdrawal of 
its notice of dismissal of its suit filed on July 22, de-
fendant's motion filed August 3 having already been 
set for hearing on the. following day, December 9. 
"At the hearing of defendant's motion which, as 
above stated, was framed in the alternative, namely, 
that (1) plaintiff's notice, filed July 22, of its dismissal 
of the present suit be struck out or (2) that this notice 
of dismissal be declared to operate as an adjudication 
on the merits and that the dismissal was therefore with 
prejudice, defendant insisted that it was entitled to an 
order of this Court to the latter effect. 
"After full consideration The Court 
reaches the conclusion that de~ndant's position is cor-
rect and that, therefore, it is entitled to an order dis-
missing the present action with prejudice. 
''We find no ambiguity in the words employed in 
Rule 41(a) and we have no doubt that the Rule applies 
to the present situation. This part of the Rule relates 
to voluntary dismissal of actions, that is, by plaintiff 
or by stipulation, without order of Court. After de-
scribing the two ways in which such dismissal may 
take place, namely, (1) by filing a notice of dismissal 
at any time before service by the adverse party of an 
answer or of a motion for summary judgment; which-
ever first· occurs, or ( 2) by filing a stipulation of dis-
missal signed by all parties who have appeared in the 
action, the Rule provides that 'Unless otherwise stated 
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal 
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal 
ope~rates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed 
by a plaintiff who has once dis~ in any court of 
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the United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim.' (Emphasis supplied). It is 
clear from this language that the plaintiff in the pre-
sent case could not, by the mere recital in its notice of 
dismissal of July 22, 1949, that such notice is 'without 
prejudice and without costs,' defeat the express lang-
uage of the Rule above quoted. The present plaintiff 
had, prior to July 22, 1949, that is, on November 19, 
1948, dismissed that action which it had filed in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
'based on or including the same claim' as that involved 
in the present suit in this court." 
Another case in point is that of I-Iineline v. Minneapolis 
Honeywell Regulator Company, 78 F. 2d 854. The Federal 
c·ourt in that case was required to interpret a Minneapolis 
statute, the state court having failed to rule upon the mat-
ter before the Federal Court. The section from the statute 
requiring interpretation reads as follows: 
"An action may be dismissed, without a final de-
termination of its merits, in the following cases: 
'1. By the plaintiff at any time before the trial 
begins, if a provisional remedy has not been allowed, 
or a counterclaim made or other affirmative relief de'"" 
manded in the answer: Provided, that an action on 
the same cause of action against any defendant shall 
not be dismissed more than once without the written 
consent of the defendant or an order of the court on 
notice and cause shown;" 
The aRpellant, Hineline, brought an action against the 
Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Company in the State 
Court to recover for services alleged to have been rendered 
that company at its request. The action was removed to 
the United States District Court for the District of Minne-
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apolis because of diversity of citizenship. The case was set 
down for trial. At the time appointed for the trial, plaintiff 
stated he was not ready for trial and could not proceed. 
Defendant moved for dismissal and, by order of the court, 
the case was dismissed without prejudice. Later, plaintiff 
commenced another action on the same cause of action, in 
the same State Court against the same defendant. The case 
was also transferred to the Federal Court. The issues were 
joined and the case was set fo rtrial. The defendants pre-
pared for trial and four days before the case was to be 
heard, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with-
out prejudice of his action. Upon motion of the defendant, 
the notice to dismiss was stricken and the court ordered 
the trial to be heard on the date first fixed. On the date 
of the trial, it was discovered that the plaintiff had filed 
another like notice of dismissal without prejudice. The 
court called the case for trial. The plaintiff did not appear. 
On motion of the defendant the second notice of dismissal 
was stricken from the files. The court directed a verdict 
and ordered judgments for the defendants for their costs. 
From that judgment the appeal was taken. We quote from 
the court's opinion: 
"The plaintiff contends that he had the absolute 
right to arbitrarily dismiss without prejudice his sec-
ond case, and that he did so, but that, even if it should 
be held that he did not or could not voluntarily so dis-
miss, nevertheless the court was without power to dis-
pose of the case upon its merits in -his absence. The 
defendants contend that the plaintiff had no right to 
arbitrarily dismiss, without prejudice, his second case, 
and that the precedure adopted by the court below was 
prope~r.'' 
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The court stated: 
"The statute, (supra), grants the plaintiff, fre-
quently to the prejudice and much at the expense of 
the defense, the indulgence of one arbitrary dismissal. 
. It thus appears that a plaintiff who has en-
joyed his one arbitarary dismissal and has recom-
menced his action is then substantially in the same po-
sition as one against whom a provisional remedy has 
been allowed, a counterclaim made, or affirmative re-
lief demanded in the answer. Walker v. St. Paul City 
Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 127, 130, 53 N. W. 1068. He has an 
action which he cannot dismiss except upon its merits 
unless for cause shown or by consent of the defendant." 
Quoting further: 
"We are satisfied that, under the practice in Min-
nesota, when a plaintiff who has lost his right to dis-
miss without prejudice, and who, under the pleadings, 
has the burden of proof, fails or refuses to proceed to 
trial, the proper course for the court to ·pursue is to 
enter a judgment of dismissal of the case with preju-
dice." 
Taking the testimony in the light most favorable to 
appellants, there have been three dismisals against the 
John M. Zane estate, one of which would be prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1950, when Rule 41 (a) was adopted. There are au-
thorities which hold that eve nthough one or more of the 
dismissals had been made prior to the adoption of the Rule, 
a dismisal subsequent to the adoption of the Rule operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
We call attention to the case of Cleveland Trust Com-
pany v. Osher and Reiss, 31 F. Supp. 985, and particularly 
page 1009. This is a patent infringement suit involving 
many patents, all of which bear different names, and the 
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Court, in its opinion, treats the facts and the law as to each 
patent separately. Among the patents was the Aldrich 
Patent and in this case there had been two dismissals prior 
to the adoption of Rule 41 (a) and none thereafter. Never-
theless, the defendant contended that the second dismissal 
operated as an adjudication upon the merits. The court 
said: 
''There cannot be a dismissal on the merits unless 
subsequent to the date the rule went into effect a no-
tice of dismissal was given." 
The court further stated: 
"The prior dismissals gave the opportunity to 
make the rule effective, if, subsequent to the effective 
date of the rule the notice was given. This does not 
change the effect of the action of the plaintiff in dis-
missing the action prior to the effective date of the 
Rule, but would make the notice given subsequent to 
the effective date of the rule a voluntary action on the 
part of the moving party, with notice, on which the rule 
would be applied. 
"No notice of dismissal after the rule went into 
effect was given, but the action was brought on for 
trial and that motion is denied." 
The -court then discusses what is termed the Frenier 
Patent, and the defendant asked in that case that the suit 
be dismissed on the merits. The facts show that there was 
a dismissal prior to the Rule taking effect and one after the 
Rule went into effect. The court held that the second dis-
missal was on the merits. The court states: 
''The purpose of Rule 41 was to prevent the delays 
in litigation by numerous dismissals without preju-
dice." 
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As we understand appellants' position it is that the dis-
missals made by appellants against the Zane estate do not 
fall within Rule 41 (a) because (1) they were dismissals 
made by the court, and (2) that when the Zane estate made 
a motion asking that the court find that the second dismis-
sal was an adjudication upon the merits, that the case was 
reinstated as far as the Zane estate is concerned. We shall 
first discuss proposition (1). 
There is no question under the record that the Zane 
estate had never served an answer or motion for summary 
judgment prior to the time of the dismissals, and there had 
been no stipulation for dismissal. Further, there is no dis-
pute that all dismissals were made upon motion of the at-
torneys for appellants. True it is that the court granted 
the Jnotion made by appellants. The question is then posed, 
could the attorney for appellants circumvent the nlle of 
law by proceeding as he did? 
We do not know what impelled counsel for appellants 
to dismiss the cases in the mannar in which they were dis-
missed. It may be that counsel was not familiar with Ru1e 
41 (a) , or, being familiar, may have . forgotten the effect 
thereof, but assuming the facts most favorable to appel-
lants, let us assume counsel was familiar with the rule and 
purposely followed the procedure which was followed. That 
can avail him nothing because he, as well as the courts, are 
bound by the rules.of law and procedure the same as liti-
gants, and what the court did in this case cannot have the 
effect of bringing the dismissals under paragraph 2 of Rule 
41. Appellants and their counsel are charged with notice 
of the law and in this case no responsive pleading had been 
filed by the Zane estate, and the dismissals were under Rule 
41 (a). 
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Rule 41 is discussed in Barron and Holtzoff's Federal 
Practice and Procedure, volume 2, page 614 and following. 
At page 615, note 14, the following appears: "Under Rule 
41 (a), plaintiff's right to dismiss generally, before service 
of answer or of motion for summary judgment is absolute, 
and is accomplished merely by filing of notiee of dismissal, 
although after such service plaintiff may not dismiss ex-
cept upon order of court and upon such terms as court 
deems proper. Wilson and Co. v. Fremont Cake and Meal 
Co., D. C. Neb. 1949, 83 F. Supp. 900." Other cases are 
cited to the same effect. 
For a dismissal to be operative tmder Rule 41(a) (1) 
it need not apply to all of the defendants. A second dis-
missal against some but not all of the defendants operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits so far as those defend-
ants against whom there is a second dismissal are concerned. 
Friedman v. Washburn Co., 145 F2d 715, at pages 718-19. 
The notice of dismissal provided by Rule 41 (a) (1) is 
new to our practice. Notice of such dismissal need not be 
given. The notice is merely filed in the action by the plain-
tiff. "The plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal before 
the service of an answer or motion for summary judgment 
need only be filed with the clerk and is not required to be 
served on the other parties. It is merely a notice and not 
a motion, although a notice in the form of a motion has 
been held sufficient for the purpose.'' Barron and Holtzoff, 
Federal p·ractice and Procedure, volume 2, page 618; Silver 
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, D. C. Conn. 1948, 
80 F. Supp. 541. 
On the facts of this case·, the appellants had the abso-
lute right to dismiss against the Zane interests. 
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The gist of the argument of appellants is that the ru1es 
may be circumvented by failing to comply with them. It 
is to be noted that there is no provision in Rule 41 (a) which 
allows the court to make an order of dismissal where the 
defendant has not answered or filed a motion for summary 
judgment. The recitals in the orders of dismissal that the 
dismissals are without prejudice cannot be of significance. 
If it were otherwise, then the parties and the court may 
defeat the operation of the rules by placing something in 
the order of the court contrary to the provisions of the rules. 
As \Ve have pointed out, the dismissals, if they are effective 
against the Zane estate, must have been n1ade pursuant to 
Rule 41 (a) ( 1) . ''A recital in the motion of dismissal of a 
second action that it is without prejudice does not prevent 
its operation as an adjudication upon the merits." Page 
146 of the 1954 Pocket Supplement to Barron & Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure; Robertshow-Fulton Con-
trols Co. v. Noma Electric Corp., (supra). 
In support of what we have just said, we invite atten-
tion to the case of White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 41~. 
The facts in the case are very brief. This was an action 
against a railroad, and the railroad made a motion to dis-
miss on two grounds. First, that the prosecution of the 
case in any other location outside the State of Arkansas 
constituted an unreasonable burden upon interstate com-
merce, and second, that the prosecution in the Federal c~ourt 
of illinois vv-as inconvenient, inequitable~, burdensome and 
oppressive to the defendant. The court granted defend-
ant's motion ordering the case transferred to Arkansas. 
Within the ten day period limited in the court's memoran-
dum, the parties simultaneously presented motions. The 
plaintiff move the court to dismiss the case without preju-
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dice. The defendant moved the eourt to transfer the case 
to Arkansas. It was the contention of the defendant that 
the dismissal should be upon terms, and was under para-
graph 2 of Ru1e 41. We quote from the court's opinion: 
"The plaintiff has moved the court to dismiss the 
cause and, the~fore, shou1d, it is assumed, be held 
to be a proceeding under Ruie 41 (a) (2). But, upon 
considerations 9f the question as to what "terms and 
conditions" should be imposed on the dismissal, it is 
proper that the court consider the terms of Rule 41 (a) 
(1). No answer has been filed in this case, neither has 
a motion for summary judgment been filed. Therefore, 
the plaintiff probably had the right to file a notice of 
dismissal under Rule 41 (a) (1). Since he had this 
right, it seems to the court that ''terms and conditions 
should not be imposed upon the dismissal. According-
ly, the motion of the plaintiff to dismiss without pre-
judice, at plaintiff's costs, will be granted. An order 
to that effect has this day been made." 
Under the title "C. Evidence," appellants' brief, ap-
pellants contend that the court erred in admitting Civil Ac-
tion 2693 because "it is not within the issues of the case", 
and secondly, ''there is no pleading to warrant introduction 
of the file in this case." There are at least three reasons 
why there is no merit to this contention: (1) The Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not require one to · plead evidence. 
We pleaded more than was necessary \vhen we pleaded the 
dismissal of Civil Action Nos. 2693 and 2764 as to the Zane 
estate; (2) 'The pleadings fully advised appellants of the 
Zane defense; and (3) We believe that under the rules 
and under the decided cases, we were not requird to file 
any pleadings on behalf of the Zane estate, and that it was 
not necessary fo\f appellants to be present to authorize the 
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court to enter judgment on the merits against appellants. 
When the second dismissal was made, the case against 
the Zane estate was terminated, and there was nothing for 
the court to do but enter judgment in favor of the estate. 
There v1as nothing appellants or the court could do to re-
vive the action. 
POINT IV 
THE ESTATE OF HANNAH J. BRAFFET, ,DE-
CEASED, HAS NO RIGHT, TITLE O·R INTEREST IN 
THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT AND 
IN THE FI1\l"DINGS OF FACT. 
The propositions posed by Points I\7" and V of appel-
lants' brief is illustrative of the dilemma with which the 
respondents \Vere confronted during all of these proceed-
ings. The contentions made by appellants are not new. 
They were urged upon the trial court in the first briefs sub-
mitted by appellants. The trial court, wisely, in our opin-
ion, failed to make any findings or conclusions respecting 
appellants' contentions. There is absolutely no pleading by 
any of the parties which raise these issues. It is true that 
the question has been raised by appellants in their briefs 
and that we filed briefs answering those contentions. We 
did this for the same reason that we never made any issue 
of the fact that appellants had not pleaded the statute of 
limitations, the reasons being that we felt that we had a de-
fense so far as the statute of limitations was concerned 
,. 
and that there was nothing to appellants' contention re-
garding the propositions raised in Points IV and V. How-
ever, appellants having raised the issue again, we again 
deem it necessary to make a short reply thereto. 
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First, we submit that if the Smiths are barred by the 
statute of limitations, they do not care who is the owner 
of the land in question. On the other hand, if the Court 
holds that the decision of the lower court should be af-
firmed as to the Smiths, it can be of no concern to the ap-
pellants what are the respective rights of the Smiths and 
Maude White Waring. 
S~cond, appellants are attempting to make a collateral 
attack upon a decree of the Seventh Judicial District Court 
of Carbon County entered in that court on August 10, 1927, 
without any pleadings of any kind raising that issue. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit C for Decree of Distribution, pages 148-
152). 
Third, assuming for the sake of the discussion, that 
appellants had, by proper pleading and process, joined the 
Hannah J. Braffet estate and the three children of Mark 
P. Braffet in this case, the law will not support appellants' 
contentions. Appellants cannot be in a more favorable po-
sition to attack the De·cree of Distribution entered in the 
Mark P. Braffet estate than Hannah J. Braffet would be 
if she were living. Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, page--~-· --f-( __ _ 
shows that Mark P. Braffet left an estate having an ap-
praised value of more than $41,000.00, the real estate hav-
ing an appraised value of more than $28,000.00, and the 
value of the p·roperty in litigation was fixed at $150.00. The 
appraised value of the property distributed to Hannah J. 
Braffet was real property $17,600.00, and personal prop-
erty $3-,900.00. 
There was distributed to Maude White Waring prop-
erty having a total appraised value of $3,900.00. The other 
property was distributed to the two sons of the Braffets. 
All of the property was distributed in accordance with the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
petition filed with the court, the contents of which Hannah 
J. Braffet and the children approved. This is shown by 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, pages 103 to 111. 
It is evident in this case that the widow and her chil-
dren entered into an agreement for the division of the prop-
erty left to them upon the death of Mark P. Braffet, and 
that the court, pursuant to that agreement, distributed the 
property in question to Maude White Waring. We submit 
that all of the courts give effect to family agreements un-
less there is fraud in connection therewith. Authorities 
for this proposition will be found in Vol. 4 of Bancroft's 
Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Seetion 1150, page 444. 
Among the cases cited therein is one from c~alifornia, in Re 
Howe Estate, 199 P. 2d 59: 
"Stipulations concerning the amount to be con-
sidered community property and to determine the wi-
dow's share thereof, ifnot illegal or contrary to policy, 
are not only approved by ·the law but the courts seek 
to sustain rather than overturn such compromise meas-
ures.'' 
This question is annotated in A. L. R. and the most re-
cent cases we have found therein are those cited in 54 A. 
L. R. 976. Among the cases cited is the case from Georgia 
reported in 134 S. E., 194; in which it was held that an 
agreement between the widow and the heirs of an estate 
that she take a stipulated portion of the estate in lieu of 
her rights as a widow, including the provisions for an heir's 
support, would be upheld against her later repudiation in 
the absence of the showing of fraud or mistake. 
"An agreement between the widow, heirs, next 
of kin, all being adults, as to certain matters in the 
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settlement of an intestate's estate, was held to be a 
valid and binding agreement." 207 S. W. 209. 
"The law looks with favor on family compromises 
or agreements or the settlement of intestates' estates 
' and when no right of creditors intervenes, such agree-
ments if free fro mfraud, are upheld and enforced by 
the courts." 176 N. W. 547. 
"The law favors compromises and settlements 
among the heirs, distributees, devisees and legatees of 
the decedent's estate and will enforce such agreements 
when made between persons having the legal capacity 
to contract." 21 A. J. Sec. 21, page 381. 
Also, see 16 Am. Jur., Sec. 145, page 925. 
A compromise and settlement among heirs, distributees, 
devisees and legatees of an intestate's estate, where free 
from fraud, are favored and enforcd by the law subject to 
the rights of creditors. Citing a case from Georgia, 178 S. 
E .. 52, we quote from the syllabus: 
"Where consent division of an estate has been 
made between distributees, each distributee ipso facto 
acquires a perfect equity in the property set apart to 
him and loses all interest in that assigned to the other 
distributees. '' 
Another case cited is from Kansas, Riffe v. Walton, 182 
Pac. 640. We quote from that case: 
"No rights of creditors being involved, it is com-
petent for the widow and the heirs of an estate to en-
ter into an agreement for the distribution of an estate 
on a plan different from that prescribed by the stat-
utes on descents and distributions." 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed for 
the following reasons: 
(1) The failure of the Duchesne County Auditor to 
attach his affidavit to the assessment roll for the year 1929 
voided the tax sale made by Duchesne County. 
(2) The statute of limitations upon which appellants 
rely was tolled by the filing of Civil Actions Nos. 2693 and 
2764. 
(3) The dismissal by appellants of Civil Actions Nos. 
2663, 2693 and 2764 as to the John l'ilaxcy Zane estate op-
erated as an adjudication upon the merits. The dismissal 
of these actions upon motion of appellants were disr.oissals 
under Rule 41(a). 
(4) Maude Braffet White Vvaring acquired a one-
third interest in the 600 acres of land in question under the 
Decree of Distribution in the Mark P. Braffet es.tate, and 
appellants' att~mpted collateral attack upon the Smiths' 
title is a nullity and of no effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DA.LLAS H. YOUNG, 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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